That Difference is Different From Being: Sophist 255 c 9–e 2 (2024)

Michael Wiitala

1. Introduction

As a survey of the secondary literature on Plato’s Sophist reveals, the argument by which the Eleatic Stranger distinguishes the kind being from the kind different (255 c 9–e 2) is one of the most controversial in the dialogue.1 Moreover, it is often considered one of the most important.2 The argument closes the portion of the dialogue in which the Stranger demonstrates that each of the five ‘greatest kinds’ (μέγιστα γενή) is distinct from the others (254 d 4–255 e 2). Having shown that rest, motion, same, and different are distinct from one another and that rest, motion, and same are distinct from being, the Stranger argues that different is also distinct from being. The distinction between different and being is a crucial step in the Stranger’s overall account of non-being, according to which non-being is ‘the contraposing of the nature of a part of different and the nature of being’ (ἡ τῆς θατέρου μορίου ϕύσεως καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος…ἀντίθεσις, 258 a 11–b 1).3 Furthermore, it is in the argument distinguishing different and being that the Stranger identifies the features of these forms that make the contraposing of a part of different and being possible. Beings, we are told, are themselves according to themselves (αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά) or relative to others (πρὸς ἄλλα, 255 c 13–14),4 whereas anything different is always relative to something different from it (255 d 1, 255 d 6–7). Although what these features of being and different amount to is a matter of considerable controversy, they are fundamental to the Stranger’s account of being and non-being.

While commentators have developed many careful interpretations of the argument distinguishing different from being, deciding between those interpretations is difficult. Due to key ambiguities in the text, no interpretation can claim to be the only plausible one, and each comes at a cost. The main disagreement concerns the distinction between beings that are auta kath’ hauta, ‘themselves according to themselves’, and beings that are pros alla, ‘relative to others’. Following John Malcolm, I will refer to this distinction with the acronym KH/PA, for the two Greek phrases used to express it.5 There are four main reasons this distinction has become central to scholarly disputes. First, as already noted, it plays a crucial role in the Stranger’s account of being and non-being. Second, the Stranger has neither discussed nor put forward anything like the KH/PA distinction earlier in the dialogue.6 Third, the distinction has no precise parallel elsewhere in Plato.7 Finally, it seems that the immediate context in which the Stranger introduces the distinction offers no clear indication of whether or not it is intended to be exhaustive,8 or to what sort of things it is intended to apply. Readers are left wondering whether it is a metaphysical distinction, a distinction between kinds of terms, a syntactic distinction, a semantic distinction, a distinction in sentence structure, or some combination of these.9 Since the immediate context in which the KH/PA distinction is introduced seems to offer little or no guidance, commentators are forced to resort to controversial interpretive principles or to what they take to be Plato’s broader concerns in the Sophist in order to decide what sort of distinction it is.

Although commentators have propounded many ways to interpret the distinction, one question that has not been explored is the placing of the comma in the counterfactual conditional at 255 d 4–6. Yet given that the Stranger only explicitly employs the KH/PA distinction in this conditional, how this conditional is construed is key to interpreting the distinction correctly. Since the construal of the conditional at 255 d 4–6 is what is in question here, I will first present the Greek on its own without the comma, before proceeding to the alternative translations:

If the comma is placed after ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν so that the phrase is read with the protasis, the following translation results:

If, in contrast, the comma is placed before ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν so that the phrase is read with the apodosis, the translation is:

Editors from Heindorf to Robinson place the comma in the first way, so that ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν is read with the protasis.10 I think this placement is mistaken, obscures the character of the KH/PA distinction, and in large part explains why the distinction has become so controversial. I will argue that placing the comma in the second way, so that ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν is read with the apodosis, allows for a more natural and straightforward interpretation of the argument as a whole and indicates that the KH/PA distinction is metaphysical, rather than syntactic or semantic.

2. Text, translation, and linguistic concerns

Since determining how to interpret the KH/PA distinction and to which clause ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν should be adjoined requires a careful reading of 255 c 9–e 2 as a whole, I reproduce Robinson’s text below, omitting the comma at 255 d 5:

The following is my translation, with ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν adjoined to the apodosis:

We can begin with a brief consideration of the linguistic concerns relevant to reading ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν in the conditional at 255 d 4–6. The conditional is comprised of three interrelated clauses: the protasis (ἀλλ’ εἴπερ θάτερον ἀμϕοῖν μετεῖχε τοῖν εἰδοῖν), the apodosis (ἦν ἄν ποτέ τι καὶ τῶν ἑτέρων ἕτερον οὐ πρὸς ἕτερον), and an adjunct comparative clause, ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν.13 The ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν clause is an adjunct in that it is not a linguistic argument in either the protasis or apodosis, that is to say, it is not syntactically required by either of them.14 In the case of ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν, as often happens, the verb and other features shared by the comparative clause and the leading clause to which it is adjoined have been omitted.15 Thus, we are left with the question of whether ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν is adjoined to the protasis or apodosis. If it is adjoined to the protasis, we have: ‘But if different participated in both forms, just as being [participates in both forms]…’; if to the apodosis: ‘…just as being [is sometimes not relative to something different], there would sometimes also among the differents be something different not relative to something different’. Either option is linguistically possible, and which Plato intends is not immediately obvious. One might be tempted to read ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν with the protasis simply because comparative clauses introduced by ὥσπερ occur after or within their leading clauses more frequently than they precede them. Yet given that comparative clauses with ὥσπερ do sometimes precede their leading clauses—even in cases where the comparative clause has no verb and there is no corresponding demonstrative adverb (e.g. οὕτως or ὧδε) in the leading clause16—to read ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν with the protasis without carefully considering which reading best advances the philosophical argument the Stranger is making would be remiss. Since whether ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν adjoins to the protasis or apodosis cannot be decided on the basis of syntax or word order,17 I now turn to the philosophical content of the Stranger’s argument.

3. ‘Participated in both forms’ at 255 d 4 and the ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν clause

The philosophical consideration most relevant to determining the clause to which ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν adjoins is how to read the phrase ‘participated in both forms’ (ἀμϕοῖν μετεῖχε τοῖν εἰδοῖν) at 255 d 4. Should the phrase be taken in a non-technical sense, in which case ‘both forms’ would refer to the two traits or characteristics identified by the KH/PA distinction and to ‘participate’ in them would simply mean to possess them? Or should it be taken in the technical sense, such that the two forms are metaphysical entities that cause their participants to be the way they are? If taken in the non-technical sense, the Stranger is asking Theaetetus to consider what would follow if a different possessed both the characteristic of ‘being itself according to itself’ and the characteristic of ‘being relative to others’. If taken in the technical sense, the Stranger is presumably asking Theaetetus to consider what would result metaphysically if a different participated in both the form different and the form being. I will argue that taking ‘participated in both forms’ in the technical sense is more natural and should be adopted if there is a plausible reading of the argument that permits it.

The following considerations show why the technical sense is more natural. The word ‘metechein’ (to participate, share in) is used nineteen times in the Sophist.18 In fifteen of those cases it is clearly used to indicate participation in a form in the technical sense.19 Moreover, of those fifteen instances in which ‘metechein’ is clearly technical, seven occur within a Stephanus page of 255 d 4: 255 b 1, 255 b 3, 255 e 5, 256 a 1, 256 a 7, 256 d 9, and 256 e 3. Likewise, throughout the Sophist, the word ‘eidos’ (form) is almost exclusively used as a technical term. The word ‘eidos’ appears forty-eight times in the dialogue.20 If we except from consideration its use at 255 d 4, the only time it is used in a non-technical sense is at 266 c 4, during the Stranger’s final attempt to define sophistry. There ‘eidos’ is used to describe the image or reflection produced by mirrors and other smooth surfaces. In all other instances, again if we except 255 d 4 from consideration, ‘eidos’ unambiguously means form in the technical sense. Thus, ‘participated in both forms’ at 255 d 4 should be understood technically, if there is a plausible construal that permits it. Furthermore, the conclusion the Stranger immediately draws from the argument of 255 c 9–d 7 is that ‘the nature of a different must be said to be a fifth among the forms [τοῖς εἴδεσιν] we are selecting’ (255 d 9–e 1). This not only confirms that ‘participated in both forms’ should, if possible, be understood in the technical sense, but also that it should be read as referring to participation in two of the only five forms named and under discussion in this portion of the dialogue: rest, motion, being, same, and different. Therefore, the most natural reading of ‘participated in both forms’ would, if possible, both (1) render it in the technical sense and (2) identify the two forms as two of the five the Stranger is selecting.

Yet a plausible reading that renders ‘participated in both forms’ as participation in two of the five the Stranger is selecting is impossible if ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν is adjoined to the protasis. The following translates the conditional with ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν so adjoined:

The Stranger wants Theaetetus to conclude that the claim in the protasis is false: different does not participate in both forms. If it did, there would sometimes be a different not relative to something different, which is impossible, because a different is always relative to something different (255 d 1, 255 d 6–7). Since ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν is here read with the protasis, in order to take ‘participated in both forms’ in the technical sense, the two forms would have to be such that a being participated in both, while a different only participated in one. Yet what two forms could play this role? The forms being and different could not, since there is no plausible way to have a being participate in both different and being, while a different only participates in one of them. Whichever way we construe the cases, they ought to be treated symmetrically. Thus, different and being are not the two forms mentioned at 255 d 4 if ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν is read with the protasis. Likewise, neither are rest, motion, or same—the other forms among the five the Stranger is selecting. Cases with those forms would also need to be treated symmetrically. Moreover, there is no indication whatsoever that rest, motion, or same are relevant to the 255 d 4–6 conditional. With ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν adjoined to the protasis, therefore, the forms mentioned at 255 d 4 cannot be any of the five greatest kinds.

Since the Stranger has indicated that the five kinds are the only forms under discussion at this point in the dialogue (254 b 8–d 5, 254 d 14–255 a 2), ‘participated in both forms’ does not appear to refer to forms or participation in the technical sense at all, if ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν is read with the protasis. Hence, although contemporary interpretations of the argument of 255 c 9–e 2 differ significantly from one another, most share the feature of reading ‘participated in both forms’ at 255 d 4 in a non-technical sense, as possessing the two traits or characteristics identified by the KH/PA distinction.21 Notwithstanding, there are a handful of interpretations that take ‘participated in both forms’ in the technical sense.22 Russell Dancy, for example, argues that it refers to participation in the forms ‘standalone’ (αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά) and ‘relative’ (πρὸς ἄλλα)—forms he claims are identified by the KH/PA distinction. In order to maintain that being, but not different, participates in both standalone and relative, however, Dancy admits it is necessary to attribute a ‘use-mention ambiguity’ to Plato regarding the terms ‘being’ and ‘different’.23 Although Dancy himself claims not to find this sort of ambiguity problematic, he acknowledges others will.24 Yet leaving that aside, even if standalone and relative were forms in the technical sense, as Dancy and some others have argued, they would not be two of the five forms the Stranger claims to be selecting. If standalone and relative were two forms, one would expect the Stranger either explicitly to count them as such along with the other five or else explain why they are not included. After all, if, as Dancy argues, everything participates in either standalone, relative, or both,25 then it would seem that standalone and relative are forms whose extension is as great or nearly as great as rest, motion, being, same, and different. Since the Stranger neither counts standalone and relative among the five forms nor explains why he does not, if it is possible to give a plausible reading that can render the two forms mentioned at 255 d 4 as two of the five the Stranger is selecting, that reading would be preferable to Dancy’s and to any other that claims the two forms are standalone and relative. I will argue that such a reading is possible if ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν is adjoined to the apodosis instead of the protasis.

4. Reading the argument with ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν adjoined to the apodosis

As I have shown and as the readings of contemporary commentators evince, if ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν is adjoined to the protasis of the 255 d 4–6 conditional, it is impossible to offer a plausible interpretation of the argument in which ‘participated in both forms’ is taken in the most natural way, as referring to participation in two of the five kinds. If, however, ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν is adjoined to the apodosis, as I propose, then the two forms mentioned at 255 d 4 can be the forms different and being, the two the Stranger is trying to distinguish in the immediate context. I will first present my construal of the argument and then defend it.

With ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν adjoined to the apodosis, the argument that being and different are distinct forms can be construed as a simple reductio with two premises. The first premise is the KH/PA distinction: some beings are what they are themselves according to themselves, whereas other beings are what they are relative to others (255 c 13–14). The second premise is the claim that something different always is what it is relative to something different (255 d 1, 255 d 6–7). After stating these two premises, the Stranger uses the counterfactual conditional in 255 d 3–4 to introduce the assumption for reductio. He asks Theaetetus to consider what would result ‘if being and the different were not entirely distinct [forms]’ (255 d 3–4), that is to say, if the forms being and different were identical. Next, in a second counterfactual conditional—the conditional at 255 d 4–6 we have been considering throughout this paper—he explains what would result, drawing out the contradiction. I propose the following reconstruction of the argument, which I will explain and defend afterwards:

The main advantage of this reconstruction is that it (a) enables us to take ‘participated in both forms’ (ἀμϕοῖν μετεῖχε τοῖν εἰδοῖν) at 255 d 4 in the technical sense and (b) read the two forms as different and being. As demonstrated in Section 3, no reading that adjoins ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν to the protasis of the 255 d 4–6 conditional can achieve both these desiderata. My reading, in contrast, since it adjoins ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν to the apodosis, can render the claim made by the protasis as line (4) above. I will now explain how.

In the 255 d 4–6 conditional and throughout the passage, the Stranger speaks not only of the forms different and being, but also about the differents and beings that participate in them. Commentators disagree about what such participant differents and beings are in this context. Some argue, for example, they are the properties different and being.26 Others claim they are instances of the forms different and being, that is to say, the qualities of different and being immanent in things.27 Still others regard them as terms ambiguous between use and mention, which refer at once to individuals, properties, linguistic subjects, and linguistic predicates.28 On my reading, a participant in different, in this context, is what a different is insofar as it is different, while a participant in being is what a being is insofar as it is.

The textual basis for my reading comes near the end of our passage, where the Stranger says, ‘it is now obvious to us that whatever is different has, by necessity, turned out to be this, just what it is (ὅπερ ἐστίν), from something different’ (255 d 6–7). The Stranger there articulates more precisely what he said at 255 d 1: ‘a different [is] always [said to be] relative to something different’. In light of 255 d 6–7, the claim in 255 d 1 is that anything different is what it is relative to something different. On the grammatical level, however, the Stranger’s question to Theaetetus in 255 d 1 has an elliptical construction dependent on what the Stranger says in 255 c 13–14: ‘among beings, some are [always] said [to be] themselves according to themselves, while some are always said [to be] relative to others’. Thus, if ‘different’ in 255 d 1 should be glossed as ‘what a different is as such’, then ‘beings’ in 255 c 13–14 should be glossed as ‘what beings are as such’. Hence, I construe the claim at 255 c 13–14 as ‘some beings are what they are themselves according to themselves, whereas some beings are what they are relative to others’. A small being, for example, only is such—is a small being—relative to something else, namely to a large being. To put it otherwise, what something small is only participates in being relative to something else. A human being, by contrast, is a being itself according to itself. A sign of this difference between a human being and a small being is that an account of what it is to be human will identify features of human nature itself, such as rationality or animality, whereas an account of what it is to be small will require reference to things other than smallness, namely to large things. The sort of account needed differs because, while beings with natures like small, large, quicker, different, and so on are beings relative to others, beings with natures such as human, oneness, courage, or angling are beings themselves according to themselves. The nature of a given thing determines whether it participates itself according to itself or relative to others in the form being.

Using the Stranger’s focus on the ‘what it is’ of different in 255 d 6–7 to guide construing his claims in 255 c 13–14 and 255 d 1 not only makes good sense of those claims, but more importantly renders the argument as a whole such that the two forms mentioned in the 255 d 4–6 conditional will be the forms different and being. If we take ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν in the apodosis, the 255 d 4–6 conditional reads:

I take the Stranger to be using ‘different’ here to mean ‘what a different is, insofar as it is different’. Moreover, he holds that a different is what it is in virtue of participating in the form different (see esp. 255 e 3–6). The conditional, therefore, is describing a consequence that would follow if something different were what it is in virtue of participating both in different and in being, instead of just in virtue of participating in different. Of course, everything participates in both different and being. Nevertheless, what something is in virtue of participating in different—namely something insofar as it is different—is not identical to what something is in virtue of participating in being—namely something insofar as it is a being. For example, something different is something different in virtue of participating in different, whereas something different is something that is in virtue of participating in being. The 255 d 4–6 conditional explains what would follow if what a thing is in virtue of participating in different were identical to what a thing is in virtue of participating in being. For a different to participate in both different and being would be for anything different, just insofar as it is different, to be identical to anything that is, just insofar as it is. Yet obviously this is not the case. Instead, what it is to be different is distinct from what it is to be.

This sort of construal of the protasis of the 255 d 4–6 conditional, however, is only possible if ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν is adjoined to the apodosis. Otherwise, the protasis would read, ‘if a different participated in both forms, just as being does…’, with the result that the two ‘forms’ would have to be the characteristics ‘being itself according to itself’ and ‘being relative to others’, despite the fact that those characteristics are not identified as forms, much less as two of the five under discussion in this portion of the dialogue.

5. Conclusion

Sophist 255 c 9–e 2 is a difficult passage. Key terms and phrases in the Greek are ambiguous. Moreover, the text gives commentators little to work with in resolving these ambiguities. Some ambiguities are easier to decide than others, however. I have argued that the ambiguity of ‘participated in both forms’ at 255 d 4, regarding whether it should be read as referring to participation in two of the five forms the Stranger claims to be selecting, has a clear resolution. Since ‘metechein’ (to participate) and ‘eidos’ (form) are both used as technical terms throughout the Sophist digression, any interpretation should, if at all possible, read ‘participated in both forms’ at 255 d 4 in the technical sense. Additionally, if possible, the two forms should be two of the five greatest kinds. I have also argued, however, that to interpret the two forms mentioned in 255 d 4 as two of the five kinds requires reading ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν with the apodosis of the conditional at 255 d 4–6. With ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν adjoined to the apodosis, it is possible to interpret the Stranger’s argument such that the forms mentioned in 255 d 4 are the forms different and being, as I demonstrated in Section 4. Moreover, reading ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν with the apodosis allows the 255 d 4–6 conditional to provide a more determinate frame of reference for interpreting both the KH/PA distinction and the argument as a whole. With ὥσπερ τὸ ὄν adjoined to the apodosis, the KH/PA distinction is clearly metaphysical, rather than syntactic or semantic, and identifies two ways in which beings can be what they are. The argument as a whole, in turn, shows that different and being are distinct forms by demonstrating that what something is in virtue of participating in different is not identical to what something is in virtue of participating in being. A small change in punctuation, therefore, leads in this case to a valid and, I think, persuasive reconstruction of the Stranger’s argument.

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